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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP JEFFREY D. DINTZER (Bar No. CA 139056) DENISE G. FELLERS (Bar No. CA 222694) 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, California 90071-3197 Telephone: (213) 229-7000 Facsimile: (213) 229-7520 Attorneys for Respondent Goodrich Corporation CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	IN THE MATTER OF PERCHLORATE CONTAMINATION AT A 160-ACRE SITE IN THE RIALTO AREA (SWRCB/OCC FILE A-1824) GOODRICH CORPORATION'S NOTICE OF MOTION, MOTION, AND OBJECTIONS REGARDING SUSPENSION OF THE PUBLIC HEARING ON GROUNDS THAT IT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS RIGHTS Date: TBD Date: TBD Place: San Bernardino County Auditorium
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD IN THIS ACTION: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on a day and time to be determined, before the Chair of the State Water Resources Control Board, Tam Doduc, Designated Party Goodrich Corporation ("Goodrich") will and hereby does move for an Order suspending the public hearing pending a revision of the procedures, including the timeline leading up to the hearing, the availability of discovery procedures, and the time allocations to the

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parties at the hearing itself, so as to protect the parties' right to due process.

This motion is made on the grounds that the current timeline for the submission of written materials, the time limitations imposed for the presentation of evidence and rebuttal of other parties' evidence at the hearing, the lack of discovery, and the appearance of prosecutors in this matter as witnesses at the hearing, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Seven of the California Constitution.

Goodrich also hereby objects to the Hearing Notice and the procedures set forth therein on the grounds stated herein.

This motion is based upon this Notice, the attached written Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and such other evidence as may be presented at or prior to the hearing on this matter.

Dated:March 5, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

MANATT, PHELP\$ & PHILLIPS, LLP GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP

By:

Peter R. Duchesneau

Attorneys for Respondent GOODRICH CORPORATION

The timeline and procedures set forth in the State Water Resources

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I. INTRODUCTION

Control Board's (the "Board") Notice of Public Hearing in the Matter of Perchlorate Contamination at a 160-Acre Site in the Rialto Area (SWRCB/OCC FILE A-1824), dated February 23, 2007 (the "Notice"), violate Goodrich Corporation's ("Goodrich") federal right to due process as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. At its core, procedural due process encompasses the concept of "fundamental fairness" and, as broadly construed by the courts, includes an individual's right to be adequately notified of charges or proceedings involving him, and the opportunity to be fairly heard at these proceedings. In this context, the timeline and procedures adopted by the Board deprive Goodrich of its ability to receive a fair adjudication of its rights. Accordingly, the Board should suspend these proceedings and adopt legally valid hearing procedures that guarantee Goodrich's right to present and confront evidence on its and other parties' legal responsibility for site investigation and remediation of the perchlorate contamination in the Rialto area.

II. THE SCOPE AND BREADTH OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE RELATIVE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RIGHTS BEING ADJUDICATED AND THE PROCESS IN QUESTION

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that because this due process guarantee is a matter of federal law, it may not be diminished by state-specified procedures, even if the state deems the procedures to be adequate. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (holding that federal due process rights "are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action"). "Before a person is deprived of his life, liberty or property he must be given notice of the proceedings against him, he must be given an opportunity to defend

with essential fairness." *People v. Swink*, 198 Cal. Rptr. 290, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).

The measure of procedure that is necessary to guarantee a person's right

himself, and the propriety of the deprivation must be resolved in a manner consistent

The measure of procedure that is necessary to guarantee a person's right to a fair adjudication of contested legal rights differs significantly according to the nature of the dispute at hand. As explained by the California Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District:

Procedural due process is a flexible concept that does not establish universally applicable procedures for the resolution of all types of issues. The process which is due may depend upon a variety of factors, including the nature of the interest involved, the nature of the proceeding and the possible burden on that proceeding. While the types of procedures which are sufficient are variable with the type of action, minimum due process requires some form of notice and an opportunity to respond.

Sommerfield v. Helmick, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

The United States Supreme Court has also long held that the amount of due process protection necessary to pass Constitutional muster depends entirely upon the nature of the dispute before the administrative body. "[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing *appropriate* to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis added). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (holding that due process "calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands"). Due process must therefore be assessed case-by-case, based on the totality of the circumstances.

III. THE HEARING PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE BOARD VIOLATE GOODRICH'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

More than thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court set forth a three-factor balancing test for determining whether administrative procedures are sufficient for due process purposes. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (finding that "[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.") (internal quotations omitted). The

Court explained that it would analyze the adequacy of due process by looking at:

[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 335. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 329 F.3d 700, 710-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's approval of a corporate reorganization of certain Pacific Gas & Electric Co. subsidiaries).

Applying this three-pronged balancing test here leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the Board's hearing violates Goodrich's due process rights. The private interest in this case is great, as Goodrich is at risk potentially for substantial investigation and remediation costs. Second, given the scope and nature of this particular case, the timelines and procedures set forth in the Notice deny Goodrich an adequate opportunity to be heard, and thus threaten its Constitutional right to due process. Lastly, the Board's interest in an expedited review of this matter using truncated and informal procedures cannot override the threat that Goodrich may not receive a fair hearing.

A. The Hearing Will Impinge on Goodrich's Property Interests

As stated in the Notice, the purpose of the Hearing is to "receive evidence to determine whether to amend or reissue the 2005 CAO and whether to adopt the 2006 Draft CAO, as written or amended, for the investigation and remediation of perchlorate in the Rialto area, or take such other action the State Water Board deems appropriate." The Rialto Cleanup and Abatement Order ("CAO") cited in the Board's Notice purports to hold Goodrich and other private parties liable for the discharge of perchlorate into the groundwater and to require the private parties to "clean up the waste or abate the effects of the waste, or . . . take other necessary remedial action, including but not limited to, overseeing cleanup and abatement efforts." See Draft Amended CAO No. R8-2005-0053 at 1.

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A finding that Goodrich is obligated to address the perchlorate contamination in the Rialto area is no small matter; it may require the expenditure of great sums over the span of decades, depending upon the scope of remediation required and the appropriate perchlorate action levels. For example, the Regional Board and the City of Rialto allege that the cost to comply with the proposed CAO is between \$200 million to \$300 million (see, e.g., http://www.ci.rialto.ca.us/perchlorate/water_rialto-perchlorate-plan.php). Any recommendation reached by Ms. Doduc, based upon the presentation of the evidence in this rushed setting, therefore places Goodrich's property interests directly, and significantly, at risk. This is not a social security benefits case or a license renewal hearing, but a hotly contested dispute over responsibility for the remediation of releases that occurred over the past half-century. Any procedure that does not resemble a full trial and that does not provide adequate time to prepare, discovery, and cross-examination of all witnesses will not provide a fair and reasonable adjudication of the issues.

B. The Procedures Provided in the Hearing Notice Present a Significant Risk that Goodrich's Financial Interests Will Be Unfairly Deprived

Taken as a whole, the procedures established by the Board are insufficient to protect Goodrich's rights. The short timelines leading up to the hearing, the lack of discovery, the limitations imposed on the parties during the hearing itself, and a lack of impartial prosecutors or hearing attorney fail entirely to provide the parties a full and fair opportunity to present their case. "[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The parties lack sufficient time to prepare.

In light of the complex nature of the underlying dispute, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Goodrich's interests is large if the informal hearing procedures set forth in the Notice are followed. The Notice indicates that the Hearing will cover the

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legal responsibility for site investigation and remediation; the technical evidence justifying site investigation and cleanup; the feasibility and propriety of cleanup and other remediation requirements; and appropriate cleanup standards for protection of public health and beneficial uses of waters of the state. The scope of the hearing will cover the 160-acre Rialto site, including but not limited to, perchlorate and trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination, sources, responsible parties, investigation, and remedial actions.

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Notice at 2. The scope of the Hearing is breathtaking considering the artificially tight time constraints it adopts: it purports to decide (1) who, over the last sixty years, released perchlorate and TCE at the site; (2) whether such releases reached and are contributing to the current groundwater contamination; (3) whether Black & Decker and Emhart are the corporate successors to the operations of West Coast Loading Corporation; (4) what should be done to delineate the current groundwater contamination; (5) how to clean up the contamination in question; (6) the need for water replacement with respect to some ground water wells and the need for a water replacement contingency plan for other wells; and (7) the reimbursement of past and ongoing costs incurred by the City of Rialto, the City of Colton and West Valley Water District. In addition, the Notice was served on February 23, 2007 and the hearing is scheduled to begin on March 28, 2007 - a mere twenty-eight days later. In this circumstance, the time constraints imposed before and during the hearing simply cannot provide the parties with the necessary time to develop their factual evidence and legal arguments in such a way as to provide the tribunal with an adequate basis for making a fair and fully considered decision.

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These are all complex issues, involving disputed factual issues and expert testimony on highly technical matters – yet Goodrich will be required to submit all of its evidence in a single two-week time span, will have only one week to prepare a 40-page rebuttal to submissions by <u>five</u> other parties, and then will only have five hours to present its case at the Hearing, including time to cross-examine witnesses. Because of the enormous scope of the hearing, the six competing parties will each be forced to

introduce testimony of dozens if not hundreds of witnesses, and hundreds of thousands of pages of relevant documents. The events that must be examined span several decades. The scientific issues involved are extremely complex, and will require the participation of expert witnesses who will need to form opinions, work with the parties, and testify at the hearing.

Clearly, the process of pulling together all of this information into a reasonably full and clear written submission will take significantly longer than the two weeks allowed by the Notice. To fully analyze the submissions of the other parties and prepare a rebuttal will take significantly longer than the one week allowed by the Notice and likely more space than the 40-page limitation on rebuttal submissions. The prohibition on submitting or presenting any additional evidence after the strict deadlines serves to compound the unfairness of the timeline. The short deadlines and limitations imposed by the Board will serve to limit Goodrich's ability to participate in the proceedings and prevent it from engaging in a full dialogue on these issues in contravention of its due process rights. This limitation alone violates due process. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (holding that one of the "central concerns of procedural due process" is "the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process").

 The Board's failure to allow discovery and its requirement of a simultaneous exchange of information put Goodrich at a severe disadvantage in responding to the Regional Board's case.

The Board has created a hearing mechanism that places Goodrich and the other private parties accused in the 2006 Draft CAO of liability for the perchlorate contamination at a distinct disadvantage because they lack fair notice of the evidence that will be presented against them, preventing a fair opportunity for them to prepare an adequate defense. This violates procedural due process as Goodrich lacks adequate notice of the evidence that will be presented against it, and it has been deprived of the opportunity through discovery to investigate the legitimacy of this evidence.

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The requirement that a party receive adequate notice is a bedrock principle of procedural due process jurisprudence. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice."). Adequate notice must be designed "to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending 'hearing.'" Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). The notice of a hearing must, then, allow a party the opportunity to contest the facts and present a defense. And if the parties are not informed of the specific nature of the allegations or the government's evidence against them, then due process is violated. See, e.g., Vanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 741 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1984) (parolee's due process rights were violated by parole commission's failure to notify him that a particular DWI conviction would be used as evidence against him at a parole revocation hearing).

Here, the Notice and the CAOs cited in the Notice do not constitute adequate notice. Although they explain the Government's case regarding the parties' alleged responsibility, they do so only in general terms without adequate citation to specific evidence. For example, the 2006 Draft CAO contains 75 compound paragraphs that form the basis of the Regional Water Board's "Advocacy Team's" case against Goodrich and the other private parties. Many of the paragraphs rely only on "testimony and documents" without providing specific citations as support. See, e.g., 2006 Draft CAO at ¶ 33 ("documents and the testimony of former Goodrich employees who worked at this facility between 1957 and 1964, establishes the following facts. . . "). Moreover, the 2006 Draft CAO does not provide any details concerning the prosecution's expert testimony or its theory on how the releases alleged to have occurred over the past sixty years resulted in the Rialto contamination. If the Advocacy Team has prepared any such expert or scientific evidence to support its case - and one must assume that they have the current procedures set forth in the Notice will not allow Goodrich time or the opportunity to prepare adequate responses.

If the parties were entitled to discovery, they would be able to discern the

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nature of the evidence the Government has against them, test that evidence, and be able to prepare a defense that addressed that evidence. Moreover, because the parties must engage in a simultaneous exchange of information on March 12, 2007, Goodrich will have no opportunity to review the Advocacy Team's evidence prior to submitting its own case. And, given that the charging pleading was served on Tuesday, March 27, 2007, there are only six days between receipt of the charging pleading and when all prehearing motions and objections are due. Indeed, Goodrich has only two weeks to prepare its case in chief given the service date of the charging pleading. Because the parties have no source other than the Notice and associated documents upon which to base their understanding of the charges against them - and since these documents are general and vague with regard to the alleged misconduct - the parties have not received adequate notice of the charges against them and are "left unprepared to contest" the Government's theories, whatever those theories may be. Smith v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (agreeing that the failure of the accusation to inform a party that the Board was going to rely upon a negligence theory constituted a procedural due process violation).

The Hearing procedures established in the Notice do not ensure a fair hearing of the issues.

To expect any party to condense all of this evidence into a presentation of four and a half hours is completely unrealistic, and to insist on such artificial constraints is fundamentally unfair and a denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The same holds true for the expectation and requirement that the parties sufficiently cross-examine witnesses and rebut evidence from other parties on such a vast range of facts in a mere half-hour. Goodrich also lacks any ability to cross-examine or respond to comments submitted by other "interested parties" who choose to participate in the Hearing, see Notice at 2-3, again needlessly limiting the scope of the hearing. Such a rushed and compressed procedure in a case of this scope does not provide an adequate or meaningful opportunity for the parties to be

heard and therefore subjects the parties to a heightened risk that they will be erroneously deprived of their property, constituting an impermissible denial of due process.

Moreover, although a prosecutor is entitled to be a zealous advocate, it is a commonly accepted canon that a prosecutor may not have a personal interest in the outcome of the case. "Appointment of an interested prosecutor is... an error whose effects are pervasive. Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire prosecution..." Young v. United States ex rel.

Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 812 (1987). Here, two members of the "Advocacy Team" that is "prosecuting" the current case – Gerald Thibeault and Kurt Berchtold – are members of the Regional Water Quality Control Board ("RWQCB"), which has overseen the regulation and permitting of the 160-acre site in the past. These regulators have been on-site in the past and thus are not only witnesses to the events at issue but have been actively participating in those events and making certain determinations that are now in controversy. Therefore, they are not disinterested in the resolution of the case, and should not be permitted to participate in the prosecution. Their involvement in a prosecutorial capacity thus violates the parties' due process rights.

As this is a quasi-judicial hearing, Goodrich is entitled to a fair and impartial decision-maker. See Sommerfield, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 ("The exercise of a quasi-judicial power requires an impartial decision maker. . . ."). The manner in which the Board has convened this Hearing calls into question the motivation for its decision to hurry this matter to completion. Indeed, the existence of the perchlorate contamination in the Rialto area has been known since August 2001, when RWQCB staff sent a letter to Goodrich directing Goodrich to investigate and clean up the Rialto area, and it is uncertain why the Board feels that it is necessary to hold a hearing within a month after deciding to become involved in this dispute. Despite the fact that numerous other potentially responsible parties have been identified with respect to the Rialto contamination and federal litigation has been filed by the Cities of Rialto and Colton, the

Board continues unfairly to pursue only Goodrich, Pyro-Spectaculars, and the Emhart entities.

In the past year, a Draft CAO regarding the Emhart entities (the first part of a bifurcated proceeding) was scheduled to be heard before the RWQCB. In May 2006, Emhart commenced a challenge to the Board regarding the RWQCB's authority to hear the Draft CAO, alleging bias. In response, on October 13, 2006, the RWQCB passed Resolution No. R8-2006-0079, allowing Gerald Thibeault to appoint Walt Pettit as an independent hearing officer with the authority to conduct hearings and consider investigation and/or cleanup and abatement orders in this matter. Immediately following this appointment, the RWQCB added only two additional parties – Goodrich and Pyro Spectaculars, Inc. – to the Draft CAO.

On January 10, 2007, Mr. Pettit, purportedly acting as Deputy Executive Officer for the RWQCB, issued to Goodrich an Order Requiring Prehearing Statements, a draft Notice of Public Hearing, and a draft Hearing Procedure. The deadline for designated parties' pre-hearing statements (cases in chief) was scheduled, following an extension, for February 2, 2007. Goodrich, as well as other parties, petitioned the Board for review of Mr. Pettit's Order. On January 30, 2007, the State Board declined to review Goodrich's administrative petition. But the Acting Executive Director of the State Board advised the Regional Board to "revise the resolution" and to limit Mr. Pettit's authority. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pettit resigned his position as independent hearing officer, and the hearing dates were vacated. In February 2007, the State Board determined, by its own motion, that it would hold a hearing on the existing Draft CAOs. On February 22, 2007, the State Board held a pre-hearing conference, providing the dates of the hearing. The next day, the Notice was issued, outlining the curtailed procedures for the Hearing.

The Board's rush to establish these informal hearing procedures, and its inflexibility and refusal to entertain or negotiate any suggestions from the parties at the February 22nd pre-hearing conference, call the Board and the Hearing Officer's impartiality into question. It is clear that no rush to judgment is needed to resolve this

matter. The parties have known about the Draft CAO for some time – any deadlines now imposed are artificial and unnecessary. To ensure due process, the Board should select an impartial, third-party decision-maker to ensure that no appearance of impropriety attaches to the Hearing's final recommendations, and adopt a more formal hearing process designed to address the due process concerns outlined herein.

C. The Board's Interest in an Expedited Hearing Does Not Outweigh the Danger of Unfairness to Goodrich

As fully explained in the Notice, the fact that groundwater contamination exists in the Rialto area has been publicly known for years. Indeed, it is currently the subject of several ongoing concurrent federal lawsuits that will determine responsibility for investigation and remediation. Additionally, in July 2003, the United States Environmental Protection Agency issued a Unilateral Administrative Order under Section 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, against Goodrich and Emhart covering the same issues that are of concern here. The fact that the Board may be impatient with the Regional Board's failure to act or the pace of the federal litigation is not sufficient justification to hold a shotgun hearing without full procedural protections and adequate process.

In contrast to the huge financial burden potentially facing the parties should the informal hearing proceed as outlined in the Notice, the fiscal impact on the government would be extremely small if this matter were to proceed as a more formal administrative procedure, and in fact the administrative burden on the government would arguably be lessened if a formal procedure was employed, as the structure of such a procedure would be better equipped to accommodate a case of this magnitude and would be more likely to withstand any review or appeal. Further, in evaluating the government's interest in this circumstance, there is no exigency that would justify such an exaggeratedly expedited procedure, as has been used to justify such procedures in other circumstances, such as war or other crises requiring urgent action. *Cf. Yakus v. United States*, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (allowing for the use of expedited proceedings to

prevent severe economic damage during World War II); *Tur v. Federal Aviation Admin.*, 4 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1993) (government had a strong interest in instituting emergency license revocation proceedings against a pilot whose reckless operation of a helicopter created a danger of collisions). Indeed, both the City of Rialto and the RWQCB have repeatedly informed the citizens of Rialto and Colton that the "water is safe." Allowing additional time in the present case would not pose any such sort of economic disaster or threat to life and limb that could possibly justify the current rush to judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

A hearing to determine the rights and liabilities associated with the Rialto contamination is an immense undertaking, and one that cannot be decided fairly under the existing informal procedures set forth in the Notice. Taken as a whole, the current procedures set forth in the Notice will violate Goodrich's right to due process. The short notice period prevents Goodrich from adequately preparing its case in chief or its rebuttal before the Hearing. The lack of discovery and the simultaneous exchange of information, including highly technical expert testimony, prevent Goodrich from receiving fair or adequate notice of the charges against it or the evidence relied upon by the Advocacy Team. The hearing procedures unduly restrict Goodrich's ability to present evidence or to cross-examine and rebut other parties' evidence. Lastly, the participation of interested prosecutors and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Hearing call the impartiality of the proceedings into question. These concerns, paired with the significant financial interest of Goodrich, far outweigh any interest the Board may have in holding an expedited hearing.

Accordingly, the Board should suspend the Hearing pending revisions to the hearing procedures that will ensure adequate due process, including sufficient time to prepare for the hearing, discovery and an opportunity to investigate the Advocacy Team's evidence, including any expert testimony, and hearing procedures that would allow the presentation of evidence and cross-examination in front of an impartial decision maker to ensure fairness.

1	Dated: March 5, 2007 Respectfully submitted,
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ELPS & LLP	GOODRICH CORPORATION'S MOTION TO SUSPEND THE PUBLIC HEARING

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