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CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER OPPOSITION TO PRE-HEARING BRIEFS

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

#### I. <u>Introduction</u>

None of the briefs filed with the State Water Resources Control Board ("State Water Board") provide a compelling argument to support a change in the scope of this proceeding. Neither the prosecutorial team nor any of the non-party entities provide the State Water Board with a reasonable explanation why the scope of this hearing should be narrower or broader than the existing issue – whether California American Water Company ("CAW") has violated Condition 2 to State Water Board No. 95-10 ("Order 95-10").

The State Water Board prosecutorial team ("prosecutorial team") advances the incongruous argument that the State Water Board need only conduct a hearing on what remedy should it include in a cease and desist order. That argument completely ignores CAW's due process rights, the Water Code, and Order 95-10. The prosecution team has not even submitted evidence to support their allegations, much less allowed CAW to refute them. The State Water Board therefore needs to conduct this proceeding in a manner that addresses the question of liability.

Certain non-party entities advocate for an expanded scope. They contend that mere reference to the terms "public resources" or "public trust" in documents prepared by the prosecution team turns this proceeding into a public trust proceeding. They rely upon an incomplete read of the notice documents, ignore the principles of *res judicata* and *collateral estoppel*, the physical solution Order 95-10 imposed, to wit:

[T]he adoption of an order which, until a legal supply of water can be developed or obtained, will require Cal-Am [to]: (1) minimize its diversions from the Carmel River, (2) mitigate the environmental effects of its diversions, and (3) prepare a plan setting forth: (a) specific actions to develop or obtain a legal supply of water and (b) the dates specific actions will have occurred so that progress on the plan can be objectively monitored.

(Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 38.

When the notice documents for this proceeding are read in total and in historical context, the sole issue before the State Water Board is exactly as Hearing Officer Art Baggett stated at the prehearing conference - CAW's compliance with Order 95-10.

The prosecution team and non-party entities raise additional issues in their pre-hearing briefs, which include: (1) the level of participation by non-party entities, (2) the utility of

bifurcation, (3) the potential ramifications if this proceeding were delayed, and (4) information presented without proper evidentiary foundation or to advance non-procedural related issues.

As explained in detail below, at this time, the State Water Board should not allow any of the non-party entities to participate in this proceeding. Either they have no protectable interest, or have a protectable interest but any benefit gained from their involvement here is outweighed by the prejudice intervention would cause to the prosecutorial team and CAW.

Further, given the scope of this proceeding, the State Water Board and the hearing process would benefit from bifurcating this proceeding into two phases: a liability phase and a remedy phase. Neither the prosecutorial team nor any non-party entities advance an argument that warrants a contrary result.

Next, the prosecutorial team includes in its pre-hearing brief a section on the potential ramifications if this proceeding is delayed. CAW found that section perplexing since CAW is not seeking, and CAW is not aware of any non-party entity that seeks, to unnecessarily delay or expedite this proceeding. CAW has full faith the State Water Board will establish a process for this proceeding that is protective of CAW's due process rights and will result in an orderly and efficient resolution of the issue(s).

Finally, many of the non-party entities that filed pre-hearing briefs advance arguments that: (1) exceed the limited authority provided by the State Water Board, which permitted the filing of briefs on procedural issues, and (2) presented information without proper evidentiary foundation. For that reason, CAW files concurrently herewith a motion to strike.

## II. The State Water Board Must Maintain The Scope Of The Hearing

At the March 19, 2008 pre-hearing conference, Hearing Officer Baggett correctly noted the unambiguous language of the draft CDO, its cover letter, and the notice of hearing characterize this proceeding as a formal hearing to consider an alleged violation of Order 95-10. None of the pre-hearing briefs refuted the Hearing Officer's statement. Indeed, the history underlying this proceeding, including Order 95-10 require the scope be focused on Order 95-10 compliance.

The prosecutorial team argues that the scope of this proceeding must be narrowed, alleging that there is no issue of liability and thus the State Water Board need only consider what remedial

order the State Water Board should issue. (Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 1-2.) The Sierra Club, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance ("CalSPA"), Carmel River Steelhead Association ("Carmel Steelhead Association"), California Salmon and Steelhead Association, and the Public Trust Alliance all argue for a substantially expanded hearing; they desire a public trust proceeding. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 1-7; Carmel Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2; California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 2-4, 5; Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3-7.) The arguments for a limited scope and for an expanded scope are founded on either legally unsupported or an ignorance of the circumstances.

# A. The Prosecutorial Team's Position That The Scope Of This Hearing Must Be Limited Is Based On The Illogical Premise That There Is No Issue Of Liability

The prosecutorial team advocates for a limited scope for this proceeding. The prosecutorial team believes that there is no question whether a cease and desist order should issue, and therefore the State Water Board should bypass the liability phase of the hearing and need only focus the proceeding on the issue of remedy. (Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1.) For the reasons stated in the pre-hearing brief filed by CAW on April 9, 2008 and herein, the State Water Board cannot eliminate the determination of liability.

# 1. If The State Water Board Were To Exclude From This Proceeding The Question Of Whether A Cease And Desist Order Should Issue, The State Water Board Would Violate The Due Process Rights Of CAW

Fundamental to this proceeding are the conflicting beliefs of the prosecutorial team and CAW regarding CAW's compliance with Order 95-10. The prosecutorial team presented its position in the draft cease and desist order, the cover letter, and in its pre-hearing brief. (Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p. 1; Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO), p. 5; Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1.) CAW objected to an enforcement action quickly and clearly. (Exhibit CAW-008 (Letter from Jon D. Rubin).) In its request for hearing, CAW wrote:

It is beyond reasonable dispute that CAW is meeting the terms and conditions of Order 95-10. The Draft CDO fails to present evidence that warrants a different conclusion. . . . In addition, the Draft CDO proposes a schedule for "compliance" . .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Carmel Steelhead Association and CalSPA filed a joint Pre-hearing Brief. CAW refers herein to that joint brief as "Carmel River Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief."

.. Again, the Draft CDO also fails to present evidence to support its unworkable, proposed schedule. . . . Accordingly, if the State Water Board staff maintains its effort to impose the Draft CDO, CAW respectfully requests, pursuant to California Water Code section 1834, that the State Water Board schedule a hearing on the matter.

(Exhibit CAW-008 (Letter from Jon D. Rubin), p. 2.) At this stage in the proceeding, the State Water Board should no more accept the position of the prosecutorial team than the position of CAW. In fact, to accept either position would violate due process.

The rights of CAW at issue in this proceeding are fundamental. Both the California Water Code and principles of due process require the State Water Board to allow CAW an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of their positions. (Water Code § 1834(b); *Eshelman v. Eshelman* (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 376.) The request by the prosecutorial team to avoid adjudication of liability would deprive CAW of those rights. The State Water Board must afford CAW a full and fair hearing on that issue.

# 2. The Prosecutorial Team's Presumption That CAW Is Illegally Diverting Water Is Unsupported By Law And Ignores Order 95-10

Surprisingly, in what appears to be a disregard for the Water Code and Order 95-10, the prosecutorial team contends, albeit without any evidence or legal support, that CAW can be subject to enforcement even if CAW complies with Order 95-10. (Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1.) The State Water Board can issue a cease and desist order when it finds based on admissible evidence that one of the circumstances in subdivision (d) of Water Code section 1831 exists. The draft cease and desist order, cover letter, and prosecutorial team's pre-hearing brief all contend that CAW's continued diversions above 3,376 acre-feet per year are both a trespass and a violation of Order 95-10. That simply is not the case.

Order 95-10 is a "physical solution." "A 'physical solution' involves the application of general equitable principles to achieve practical allocation of water to competing interests so that a reasonable accommodation of demands upon a water source can be achieved." (*Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Wat. Res. Control Bd.* (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 572 citing Hutchins, the California Law of Water Rights (1956) 351-354.) The California Supreme Court explained:

With the small quantity of water available in this stream in the summer months, the trial court should thoroughly investigate the possibility of some such physical solution, before granting an injunction that may be ruinous to either or both parties. It must be remembered that in this type of case the trial court is sitting as a court of equity, and as such, possesses broad powers to see that justice is done in the case. The state has a definite interest in seeing that none of the valuable waters from any of the streams of the state should go to waste. Each case must turn on its own facts, and the power of the court extends to working out a fair and just solution, if one can be worked out, of those facts.

(Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal. 2d 501, 560-61 (the Supreme Court supporting the application of a physical solution to resolve dispute involving users of surface water).) The State Water Board, through Order 95-10, struck that type of balance, implementing a practical allocation of water based on competing interests. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 38-44.)

Put most simply, the State Water Board authorized CAW to continue diversions up to 14,106 acre-feet of water in exchange for CAW's performance of mitigation measures (many of which were proposed by the same non-party entities currently involve in this proceeding).<sup>2</sup> (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 40-44.)

The State Water Board developed its equitable solution based, in part, on the following findings of fact:

- The State Water Board staff had repeatedly told CAW that its diversions were not subject to the Board's jurisdiction. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 38.)
- [T]he total quantity of water which Cal-Am is presently using under legal rights is
   3,376 afa." (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 25.)
- "Cal-Am is diverting about 10,730 afa from the Carmel River or its underflow without a valid basis of right." (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 25.)
- "Cal-Am diversions have historically had an adverse effect on: (1) the riparian corridor along the river below RM 18.5, (2) wildlife which depends on riparian habitat, and (3) steelhead and other fish which inhabit the river." (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 28.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> One of the terms and conditions requires CAW to implement conservation measures that have a goal of achieving 20 percent conservation. (Order 95-10, pp. 40-41.) CAW is achieving that goal, and, as a result, is limiting its diversions of Carmel River water to no more then 11,285 acre-feet (20 percent of 14,106 acre-feet).

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- "Cal-Am cannot significantly reduce its extraction from the wells along the Carmel River. As previously stated, most of Cal-Am's supply is provided by the wells along the river. The people and businesses on the Monterey Peninsula must continue to be served water from the Carmel River in order to protect public health and safety." (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 37.)
- "Cal-Am should be required to implement interim measures . . . In addition, Cal-Am should be required to implement other mitigation measures. Cal-Am should be required to mitigate the effect of its diversions until such time as it is able to obtain water from the Carmel River or other sources consistent with California water law." (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 39.)

The above findings can only be interpreted as imposing a physical solution that allows CAW to continue to divert in excess of its water rights while it secures a new water source, (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), p. 40), provided CAW complies with those other terms and conditions imposed on it. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 40-44.) To find otherwise would make meaningless the practical allocation struck by the State Water Board in Order 95-10. Taking enforcement action against diverters who are not in violation of a State Water Board crafted physical solution would undermine the efficacy of the State Water Board adjudicative system. There would be no incentive to comply with a similar State Water Board order, if, at any time and without regard for compliance with the underlying order, the regulated entity or entities could be subject to an additional enforcement action. For these reasons, if the prosecutorial team believes CAW should be subject to a cease and desist order, the prosecutorial team must prove that CAW has not complied with Order 95-10.

#### В. There Is No Reasonable Basis Advanced To Support Scope Expansion

As noted previously, this proceeding has so far focused on a single issue - CAW's compliance with Order 95-10. Nonetheless, the Sierra Club, the CalSPA, the Carmel Steelhead Association, California Salmon and Steelhead Association, and the Public Trust Alliance advance three claims to support their argument that this proceeding should be expanded. (Sierra Club Prehearing Brief, pp. 1-7; Carmel Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2; California Salmon and

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Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 2-4, 5; Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3-7.) They argue that the State Water Board should balance again CAW's diversions of water from the Carmel River with potential impacts to public trust resources because: (1) the State Water Board has noticed this proceeding as such a public trust proceeding, (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 1-7; Carmel Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2; California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 2-4, 5; Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3-7), (2) the State Water Board has the duty to re-evaluate the same public trust considerations made when it issued Order 95-10 (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 1-7; Carmel Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2; California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 2-4, 5; Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3-7), and (3) the State Water Board simply has the authority to conduct such balancing. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 1-7; Carmel Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2; California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 2-4, 5; Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3-7.) None of those arguments support an expansion of the existing scope of this proceeding.

## 1. The State Water Board Has Not Noticed A Public Trust Proceeding

The Sierra Club and the Public Trust Alliance apparently disagree with the Hearing Officer and assert that this proceeding has been noticed as a public trust proceeding. (Sierra Club Prehearing Brief, pp. 1-7; Public Trust Alliance Prehearing Brief, pp. 3-7.) Those assertions are based on an incomplete read of the notice documents.

The Sierra Club relies upon Mr. Kassel's allegation that "Cal-Am's continued illegal diversions are causing continued harm to public resources of the Carmel River." (See Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2. See also Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p.1.) The Public Trust Alliance relies upon statements contained in the notice documents. The first statement is included in the proposed cease and desist order, and provides: "Cal-Am's unauthorized diversions continue to have adverse effects on the public trust resources on the Carmel River and should be reduced." (Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, pp.1-2 (quoting Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO), p. 5).) The second statement is part of the Official Notice of Hearing. It states: "The draft CDO alleges that since 2000, CAW has illegally diverted at least 7,164 afa from the Carmel River and

that CAW's unauthorized diversions continue to have adverse effects on the public trust resources on the river." (Exhibit CAW-010 (Official Notice of Hearing), p. 2.) The Sierra Club's and Public Trust Alliance's reliance on the above-referenced sentences to support an argument that this is a public trust proceeding is misplaced.

The mere mention of "public resources" or the "public trust" does not notice a larger-scoped proceeding or cause the State Water Board to re-open issues previously adjudicated. The claim that a public trust proceeding is noticed ignores the context in which the sentences were written. The references to "public resources" and "public trust" must be read in context.

For example, Mr. Kassel references "public resources" after presenting his position on CAW's compliance with Order 95-10. He wrote:

Division staff determined that in the twelve years since Order 95-10 was adopted, Cal-Am has not complied with Condition 2 of that Order. Condition 2 requires Cal-Am to terminate its unauthorized diversions from the Carmel River. Since 1995, Cal-Am has annually diverted approximately 7,150 acre-feet from the Carmel River in excess of the legitimate water right amount recognized by the State Water Board in Order 95-10.

(Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p.1.) These statements are followed by Mr. Kassel writing: "Cal-Am's continued illegal diversions are causing continued harm to public resources of the Carmel River." Exhibit CAW-007 (Letter from James Kassel), p.1.)

The paragraph, when read in total, is structured in an "if, then" fashion. This interpretation is support by Order 95-10 findings. In Order 95-10, the State Water Board determined CAW's continued diversion of water from the Carmel River would affect fish and wildlife, unless CAW implemented the required mitigation measures. Thus, if CAW fails to satisfy Order 95-10 mitigation, then public trust resources would be harmed. References to "public resources" or "public trust" in the draft cease and desist order and the Official Notice of Hearing are made within the same context as the references to those terms made by Mr. Kassel. (Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO); Exhibit CAW-010 (Official Notice of Hearing).) The Sierra Club and Public Trust Alliance have simply been misled by their isolated read of sentences in the relevant documents. They cannot

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> As explained in detail above, the same is true with regard to statements of trespass. If CAW is complying with Order 95-10, then it is diverting water with authority from the State Water Board.

be read to notify CAW that this proceeding will be one based on the public trust doctrine.

The Sierra Club also relies upon the first paragraph of the draft order proposed by Mr. Kassel to support its position. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2-4.) That paragraph explains:

The State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) is authorized under Water Code section 1831 to issue a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) requiring California American Water (Cal-Am) to make further reductions in its unauthorized diversions from the Carmel River. The State Water Board issued Order WR 95-10 (Order 95-10) in 1995, determining that a substantial portion of the diversions made from the Carmel River by Cal-Am is unauthorized. At that time, the State Water Board deferred enforcement action and instead established water conservation goals and other actions Cal-Am could take to reduce the effects of its diversions as it sought to obtain an adequate legal water supply. In the twelve years since Order 95-10 was adopted, Cal-Am has not terminated its unlawful diversions from the Carmel River. Therefore, the State Water Board is authorized to issue a CDO in accordance with Water Code section 1831(d). . . .

(Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO), p. 1.)

This paragraph, however, provides no indication that the State Water Board would conduct a proceeding balancing between the diversions of Carmel River water and impacts of those diversions on public trust resources. (Staff Exhibit 7 (Draft CDO), p. 1.) It simply reflects the disputed positions of the prosecutorial team and CAW.

As explained in detail above, in Order 95-10, the State Water Board decided a practical allocation of water based on competing interests. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 38-44.) The State Water Board authorized CAW to continue diversions in excess of its water rights in exchange for CAW's performance of mitigation measures. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 40-41.) The Sierra Club participated in the proceedings that lead to Order 95-10, the litigation that followed, and the settlement reached by those litigating Order 95-10. (CAW Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 10-14.) The Sierra Club appears to be using general language to take a second bite at Order 95-10.

# 2. No Evidence Supports The Assertion That Changed Circumstance Justify Re-Evaluation Of Impact To Public Trust Resources

The California Salmon and Steelhead Association requests an expansion of this hearing, asserting there is a need to "re-open[] and amend[] Board Order 95-10." (California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 4.) Specifically, the California Salmon and Steelhead Association asserts:

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New pertinent information since Board Order 95-10 regarding the harm and damages to threatened steelhead species and their critical habitat in the Carmel River resulting from unauthorized diversion and use of the state's water by the California American Water Company, and also the authorized pumping and use of the Carmel River by other parties.

(California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 3.) The California Salmon and Steelhead Association also posits:

The Board hearing must not be limited to 1994 because of new information. All up to date evidence (documents) through the year 2008 must be allowed into the hearing records by the Board for the re-opening of Board Order 95-10..."

(California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 4.)

Common sense, principles underlying the Water Code, and the principles underlying doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel demand that the State Water Board not re-open Order 95-10 based on the mere circumstance of new data. Clearly, the development of data since the issuance of an order justified reopening of the order, the State Water Board would have been required to reopen Order 95-10 almost immediately after it was issued. Data are collected on a regular basis.

Further, if new data alone justified reopening decisions or orders, the time limitations imposed for petitions for reconsideration and the statue of limitations for filing petitions for writ of mandamus would be meaningless. (See Water Code §§ 1122, 1123, 1124, 1126; 23 Cal. Code Regs. § 768, 769.) Instead of filing petitions, an unhappy participant could simply seek to move the State Water Board to re-open the settled matter as quickly as it could develop or acquire new data.

Finally, for the reasons stated in CAW's Pre-hearing Brief, if new data alone were sufficient to reconsider a final decision or order, particularly after an order is litigated and settled with prejudice, the bar against re-litigating the same issues or claims imposed by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel would be meaningless. (See CAW Pre-Hearing Brief, pp. 10-14.) Again, in circumstances when those doctrines apply, a participant would be able to avoid their application by seeking reconsideration by the State Water Board simply by presenting data developed since the order issued.

Moreover, the data - in the form of the California Salmon and Steelhead Association's "submitted references" -- cannot be deemed sufficient to support an expansion of this hearing. As

explained in CAW's motion to strike, the California Salmon and Steelhead Association has not provided an adequate basis for the State Water Board to rely upon any of the documents cited as "submitted references." Also, even if it were adequate, the California Salmon and Steelhead Association has provided no specific references to any data that reveals effects of CAW's diversions that were not previously considered by the State Water Board in Order 95-10.

The person or entity advancing an argument maintains the burden to support the argument, with appropriate references, which includes something more than simply attaching documents to a pleading or through a general reference. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 15(a); People v. Woods (1968) 280 Cal.App.2d 728, 731.) Others cannot be expected to undertake an independent search of the record for support for the argument. See McCosker v. McCosker (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 498, 500; People v. Sanchez (1922) 57 Cal.App. 133, 134.) The State Water Board, CAW, the prosecutorial team, and other non-party entity cannot be expected to do what the California Salmon and Steelhead Association was unwilling or unable to do. They should not have to sift through and compare all of the information in the "submitted references" and the record for Order 95-10.

Like the Sierra Club, the Public Trust Alliance claims changes since 1995 require the State Water Board to revisit Order 95-10. In its brief, the Public Trust Alliance states:

A crisis has developed and deepened in the Carmel watershed in the 13 years since the Board issued Order 95-10, requiring expeditious action within a relatively comprehensive legal framework. Bob Baiocchi describes clearly the effects on the Carmel River public trust resources . . .The urgency of the situation is an indispensible consideration in determining the adequacy of measures outlined in the Draft Cease and Desist Order. The Board should not permit any party to narrow the scope of the hearing so as to exclude the knowledge and full consideration of this crisis.

(Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, p. 3.) This rhetoric from the Public Trust Alliance and the conclusions of Mr. Baiocchi, however, are not sufficient to justify an expansion. Once again, there is no basis to support a finding that any action by CAW has caused a "crisis" or an urgent "situation."

Both the California Salmon and Steelhead Association and the Public Trust Alliance believe an expansion of this proceeding is also required because the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the steelhead as threatened under the federal Endangered Species Act. (California Salmon

and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1; Public Trust Alliance Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2.) The listing of the steelhead as threatened is a regulatory action that does not warrant an expansion of this proceeding. Through Order 95-10, the State Water Board imposed terms and conditions intended to ensure CAW mitigated the effects of its continued diversion of water. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 40-44.) Whether CAW has implemented the mitigation measures required under Order 95-10 may be one of the issues addressed in this hearing. Compliance with the federal Endangered Species Act is simply outside the jurisdiction of the State Water Board.

Finally, the Sierra Club suggests that the State Water Board should expand this hearing to address "continuing harm (since 1995)." (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, p. 3.) In support, the Sierra Club quotes paragraph 8 of the draft cease and desist order. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3.) There, the draft cease and desist order alleges that CAW is pumping water from a subterranean stream, which impacts fishery resources. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, pp. 3.) The Sierra Club raises nothing new. Once again, the manner in which CAW appropriates Carmel River water, its availability, and the impacts of CAW's diversions on fish and wildlife were all issues considered by the State Water Board during the hearing leading to and in Order 95-10. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 14-29.) The time for the Sierra Club to challenge Order 95-10 has long past. The only issue that should be before the State Water Board is CAW's compliance with Order 95-10.

#### 3. The State Water Board Has The Authority, But Not The Duty To Re-Balance The Public Trust Resources

The Sierra Club, the California Salmon and Steelhead Association, the Public Trust Alliance, and the Carmel Steelhead Association seemingly argue that the State Water Board must conduct a public trust proceeding because the State Water Board has the continuing authority to evaluate the effects of water diversions on public trust resources.<sup>4</sup> (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, p. 5; California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1; Public Trust Alliance Pre-

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> As authority to support the State Water Board's consideration of impacts to public trust resources, non-party entities cite California Fish and Game Code section 5937, California Constitution Article X, Section 2 and/or *National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine City* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419.

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hearing Brief, p. 4; Carmel Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2.) CAW does not dispute the well-established legal principle that allows the State Water Board to maintain jurisdiction over authorized water diversions to consider the impact of the water diversions on public trust resources. However, having continued jurisdiction does not per se notice this hearing as a public trust proceeding.

For the reasons presented in CAW's Pre-hearing Brief and herein, this hearing is currently focused on whether CAW has violated Order 95-10. The circumstances now before the State Water Board cannot justify a separate public trust proceeding. When it issued Order 95-10, the State Water Board balanced CAW's diversions from the Carmel River against the effects of those diversions on public trust resources. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10), pp. 40-44.) Through Order 95-10 and the resulting settlement of litigation (arguably resolved as late as 2002, when the State Water Board issued Order 2002-02 (State Exhibit 5), the State Water Board and the others involved (including the Sierra Club and the Carmel Steelhead Association) reached an agreement that CAW would be authorized to continue its diversions up to 14,106 acre-feet per year; provided that CAW diligently pursues alternative water supplies and implements mitigation measures. (Staff Exhibit 2 (Order 95-10); Staff Exhibit 4 (Order 98-04); Staff Exhibit 5 (Order 2002-02).) Accordingly, the only appropriate question at this time is whether CAW has complied with Order 95-10.

## III. The State Water Board Should Exclude Non-Party Entities From This Proceeding

## A. Status Of Non-Party Participation

A number of non-party entities erroneously claim they have been granted status to participate in this proceeding. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1 ["As a party to the above-matter, Sierra Club submits this letter-brief..."]; California Salmon and Steelhead Association Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1 ["We have standing before the Board regarding Board Order 95-10 because of our joint ownership of said people's public trust steelhead assets of the Carmel River"].) Other non-party entities request they be allowed to intervene. (Division of Ratepayer Advocates Pre-hearing Brief, cover page ["DRA respectfully requests to be reinstated as a Participant to be Served with Written Testimony, Exhibits and Other Documents"]; City of Seaside Pre-hearing Brief, p. 1 ["Del Rey Oaks intends to request permission to submit a late notice of intent to appear as a party at the

hearing"].) The State Water Board has yet to grant any non-party entity status as an interested participant or participating party, other than to CAW and the prosecutorial team. (Exhibit CAW-011 (Information Regarding Appearance at Water Rights Hearings), p. 1.) At this time, CAW opposes the participation of all non-party entities.

The State Water Board has broad discretion whether to grant a non-party entity status as an interested participant or participating party. (Cal. Code of Regs, tit. 23, § 648.1 ["The criteria and procedures applicable to participation in a Board adjudicative proceeding as an interested person may be established in the hearing notice or by the presiding officer"].) However, the State Water Board should not grant an entity status as "interested" or otherwise allow intervention if: (1) the nonparty lacks a direct and immediate interest in the action, (2) the intervention will enlarge the issues in the litigation, or (3) the reasons for the intervention do not outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. (Government Code § 11440.50 (made applicable through section 648 to Title 23 of the California Code of Regulations.) (See also Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 342, 346; Reliance Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal. App. 4th 383, 386.) Here, the facts require the State Water Board to deny all non-party entities the ability to participate in this proceeding.

# B. Non-Party Entities Should Not Participate In This Proceeding To Address Either Liability Or Remedy

The non-party entities that filed notices of intent to appear are unable to demonstrate they have a direct or immediate interest in the question of liability, or, if they have such an interest, their reasons for seeking to intervene are outweighed by the prejudice that the intervention will cause to CAW. The non-party entities offer nothing more than what could be presented by either the prosecutorial team or CAW.

In this proceeding, the State Water Board, CAW, and the prosecutorial team are the only entities that have a direct or immediate interest in CAW's compliance with Order 95-10. The non-party entities have not and are likely unable to prove they have a protectable interest related to CAW's compliance with Order 95-10. The prosecutorial team is best situated to argue that CAW has not complied with Condition 2 of Order 95-10, and CAW is best situated to defend itself.

As to remedy, some non-party entities may have an interest in the potential remedies if the State Water Board finds CAW liable. Assuming *arguendo*, an interest in public trust resources were sufficient to allow participation, the prosecutorial team will present evidence on that issue. In particular, the prosecutorial team must be able to explain why it believes the remedy it seeks will protect trust resources. The prosecutorial team has identified two experts to presumably testify on the issue: Mr. Mark Stretars and Ms. Joyce Ambroseo. (Notice of Intent to Appear filed by the Prosecutorial Team.)

Non-party entities should concede the prosecutorial team is best suited to present evidence on what is the appropriate remedy. As stated by the Public Trust Alliance in its pre-hearing brief, "[i]n addressing the implications of an agency's role as the trustee of natural resources and environmental values . . . it necessarily follows that the agency must act with diligence fairness and faithfulness to protect this particular public interest." (Public Trust Alliance Prehearing Brief, p. 7.) Indeed, a presumption exists that the prosecutorial team will adequately advocate for the interests the State Water Board has a duty to protect. (Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Service (1995 9th Cir.) 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Rizzo (1976 3rd Cir.) 530 F.2d 501, 505).)

Likewise, assuming *arguendo* an interest in the impacts of a remedy on the community were sufficient to allow participation, CAW is well situated to present evidence on those impacts. It will defend against the draft cease and desist order, including the interests of residents and businesses that depend on the water delivered by CAW. CAW and the local community share the goal of establishing a reliable water supply at the most reasonable prices available. If a remedy phase is held, CAW will coordinate with community leaders when developing its testimony.

Possibly more important, if the State Water Board were to allow non-party entities to participate in this proceeding, the proceeding will expand exponentially. The amount of evidence, number of witnesses, and post-hearing briefs would likely increase significantly. (See Notices of Intent to Appear.) As an example, non-party entities propose to present approximately 25 hours of testimony. (Ibid.) This testimony time does not include time for cross examination or rebuttal testimony. Allowing such participation would be a significant departure from the current structure

of the proceeding, which is composed of only two parties.

This type of gross expansion would likely occur even if the State Water Board were able to issue an order requiring collaboration by those with common positions or otherwise limiting their participation. The resulting change in the proceeding could impair the orderly conduct of the proceeding and would increase the burden on CAW and the prosecutorial team. The potential for this unbalanced burden is simply not worth the risk when weighed against any potential or limited interests of the non-party entities.<sup>5</sup>

For the above stated reasons, the interests of the non-party entities will be represented by CAW and the prosecutorial team. Therefore, given the limited or lack of significant benefit non-party entities would contribute, the State Water Board must find that their interest(s) do not outweigh the burden their participation would impose on CAW, the prosecutorial team, and the State Water Board.

#### IV. <u>Bifurcation Is Appropriate</u>

The prosecutorial team recognizes the utility of bifurcation, stating "bifurcation may be appropriate to enhance the efficiency of the hearing and streamline the presentation of evidence as to each of the two phases." (Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2.)<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, the prosecutorial team opposes bifurcation on the sole ground that it is unnecessary. (Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2.) That opposition is based on the prosecutorial team's improper assumption that this proceeding should not concern a question of liability. (Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 2.)

Clearly, and as explained in detail above, CAW believes the State Water Board should not issue a cease and desist order. This proceeding necessarily requires a determination of liability and, depending on how the question of liability is resolved, may require a determination on remedy. As

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> If the State Water Board nonetheless decided to allow non-party entities to participate in this proceeding, the State Water Board must exercise to the maximum extent practicable its authority under section 11440.50 of the Government Code. The State Water Board should limit involvement by non-party entities to specific issues, limit their involvement to presentation of a case in chief (no cross examination or rebuttal), require combined presentations, and exclude them from any settlement negotiations that might be pursued.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Sierra Club is the only non-party entity that also opposes bifurcation. The Sierra Club provides nothing to support its position. (Sierra Club Pre-hearing Brief, p. 7.)

that is the case, the only reasonable read of the prosecutorial team's pre-hearing brief is that it recognizes bifurcation would assist the State Water Board in conducting an expeditious hearing and maintaining a clear record in this proceeding. As such, CAW does not believe there is real opposition to bifurcation, given the existing scope of this proceeding.

#### V. Statements By The Prosecutorial Team Regarding Delay Are Perplexing

In its pre-hearing brief, the prosecutorial team writes:

If there is substantial delay in consideration of the proposed CDO to accommodate other proceedings or other agency reviews, the Prosecutorial team reserves its right to amend the draft CDO and/or to propose additional enforcement actions including but not limited to referral to the California Attorney General's Office for civil liability pursuant to Water Code section 1052(c), Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., or any other applicable statues . . .

(Prosecutorial Team Pre-hearing Brief, p. 3.) These statements by the prosecutorial team are particularly perplexing to CAW.

First, the statements are of concern to CAW because they could be read as a warning; that if the prosecutorial team does not believe this proceeding is progressing as it desires, it will present new charges against CAW. CAW assumes the prosecutorial team did not intend the statements to be read in that manner. Indeed, if that were the intent, at a minimum, the attorneys on the prosecutorial team would run afoul of California Rules Professional Conduct, Rule 5-100.

Second, CAW has not advanced any position or argument to unnecessarily affect this proceeding, nor does CAW believe the prosecutorial team or any of the non-party entities has done so – in fact, CAW believes that bifurcation will expedite the proceeding by focusing testimony on CAW's conduct in the first instance. CAW has full faith the State Water Board will establish a process for this proceeding that will protect CAW's due process rights and result in an orderly resolution of the issue(s).

Third, if the proceeding is delayed to accommodate other proceedings or other agency reviews, the delay would result from a decision by the State Water Board. Why the prosecutorial team would modify the draft cease and desist order or seek additional enforcement actions against CAW makes little sense. The prosecutorial team suggests a circumstance when it would seek increased "penalties" against CAW. However, those circumstances would exist because of an

action by the State Water Board, and it would be the State Water Board that addresses the proposed increase in "penalties." (See Cal. Wat. Code, §§ 1052, 1845.)

Finally, the prosecutorial team is proceeding to hearing based on the notice and draft cease and desist order. Any change at this point or later in this proceeding could violate CAW's due process rights. CAW does not consider the "reserved rights" to be sufficient to allow a change in this proceeding. CAW objects to the statement on the basis that it is not adequate notice of some potential future change in this proceeding.

#### VI. Briefs Filed By Non-Party Entities Include Augments and Information That Must Be Stricken From The Record For This Proceeding

Through the pre-hearing briefing, the Hearing Officers authorized all parties and non-party entities to present their respective positions on procedural issues. (Exhibit CAW-018 (Prehearing Transcript), p. 43:23-44:11.) Despite what appeared to CAW to be clear direction, a number of non-party entities filed briefs that far exceeded what could be considered relevant to procedural issues. At this point in the proceeding - particularly when the State Water Board has not ruled on the status of the non-party entities and has not issued a ruling on procedural issues - irrelevant argument and unsupported or inadequately supported assertions must not be considered. CAW has thus filed concurrently herewith a motion to strike. CAW respectfully requests that the State Water Board decide that motion at or before the time it issues a decision on procedural issues.

Dated: April 23, 2008 Respectfully submitted,

By

DIEPENBROCK HARRISON

A Professional Corporation

Attorneys for California-American Water Company

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#### 1 PROOF OF SERVICE I declare as follows: 2 I am over 18 years of age and not a party to the within action; my business address is 400 3 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800, Sacramento, California, I am employed in Sacramento County, California. 4 On April 23, 2008, I served a copy of the foregoing document following document entitled 5 CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER OPPOSITION TO PRE-HEARING BRIEFS on the 6 following interested parties in the above-referenced case number to the following: 7 8 See Attached Service List of Participants [X]BY MAIL 9 By following ordinary business practice, placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service where it would 10 be deposited for first class delivery, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business as indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted as "<u>Service by Mail</u>." 11 12 [X]**ELECTRONIC MAIL** I caused a true and correct scanned image (.PDF file) copy to be transmitted via the 13 electronic mail transfer system in place at Diepenbrock Harrison, originating from the undersigned at 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800, Sacramento, California, to the e-mail address(es) indicated in the attached Service List of Participants and noted by "Service by 14 Electronic Mail.". 15 [ ] BY FACSIMILE at BY FACSIMILE at a.m./p.m. to the fax number(s) listed above. The facsimile machine I used complied with California Rules of Court, rule 2003 and no error 16 was reported by the machine. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2006(d), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission, a copy of which is 17 attached to this declaration. [ ] A true and correct copy was also forwarded by regular U.S. Mail by following ordinary business 18 practice, placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service where it would be deposited for first-class delivery, postage fully prepaid, in 19 the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. 20 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY [ ] Federal Express [ ] Golden State Overnight Depositing copies of the above documents in a box or other facility regularly maintained 21 by Federal Express, or Golden State Overnight, in an envelope or package designated by Federal Express or Golden State Overnight with delivery fees paid or provided for. 22 [ ] PERSONAL SERVICE 23 via process server via hand by 24 25 I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on April 23, 2008, at Sacramento, 26 Heath V. Chesi 27 California. 28

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CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER OPPOSITION TO PRE-HEARING BRIEFS

DIEPENBROCK

**HARRISON** 

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#### CALIFORNIA AMERICAN WATER CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 1 JUNE 19, 2008 HEARING SERVICE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 2 3 Service by Electronic Mail: 4 **Division of Ratepayer Advocates** State Water Resources Control Board 5 Andrew Ulmer Reed Sato Division of Ratepayer Advocates Water Rights Prosecution Team California Public Utilities Commission 6 1001 I Street 505 Van Ness Avenue Sacramento, CA 95814 7 San Francisco, CA 94102 (916) 341-5889 (415) 703-2056 rsato@waterboards.ca.gov 8 eau@cpuc.ca.gov 9 Public Trust Alliance Sierra Club - Ventana Chapter Michael Warburton Laurens Silver Resource Renewal Institute 10 California Environmental Law Project Room 290, Building D P.O. Box 667 Mill Valley, CA 94942 11 Fort Mason Center . San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 383-7734 Michael@rri.org 12 larrysilver@earthlink.net jgwill@den.davis.ca.us 13 Carmel River Steelhead Association California Sportfishing Protection Michael B. Jackson 14 Alliance P.O. Box 207 Michael B. Jackson Quincy, CA 95971 15 P. O. Box 207 (530) 283-1007 Quincy, CA 95971 miatty@sbcglobal.net 16 (530) 283-1007 mjatty@sbcglobal.net 17 City of Seaside The Seaside Basin Watermaster Russell M. McGlothlin 18 Russell M. McGlothlin Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Schreck 19 21 East Carrillo Street 21 East Carrillo Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 (805) 963-7000 20 (805) 963-7000 RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com RMcGlothlin@BHFS.com National Marine Fisheries Service

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