1 **DEAN RUIZ - SBN #213515** Harris, Perisho & Ruiz 3439 Brookside Road, Suite 210 2 Stockton, CA 95210 Telephone: (209) 957-4254 3 Facsimile: (209) 957-5338 4 E-mail: dean@hpllp.com 5 Attorneys for SOUTH DELTA WATER AGENCY and CENTRAL DELTA WATER AGENCY 6 7 8 BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA 9 STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 10 In the Matter of Draft Cease and Desist **OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE** 11 Order No. 2009-00XX-DWR Enforcement Action 73 Against Woods Irrigation 12 Company 13 I. 14 **INTRODUCTION** 15 South Delta Water Agency ("SDWA") and Central Delta Water Agency ("CDWA") herein 16 oppose the motion in limine presented by Modesto Irrigation District ("MID") at the close of MID's 17 case in chief on June 25th, 2010. MID argues that Woods Irrigation Company ("WIC") is barred by 18 the doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel and by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from putting 19 on evidence of pre-1914 and riparian water rights. MID's argument is incorrect and its motion must 20 be denied. SDWA and CDWA reserves the right to make additional oral arguments on the record 21 in opposition to MID's motion. 22 II. 23 ARGUMENT 24 A. The Required Elements for Collateral Estoppel to Be Applied Are Not Present. 25 The elements required to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion are 26 well settled. As set forth in the California supreme court in Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 27 Cal.3d 335, and its progeny, the doctrine applies only if several threshold requirements are 28

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fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from re-litigation must be *identical* to that decided in the former proceeding. Second, this issue *must have been actually litigated* in the former proceeding. Third, the issue must have been *necessarily* decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements. <u>Id. at 341</u>. Even assuming all the threshold requirements are satisfied, the court must look to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting. <u>Id. at 342 - 343</u>.

The existence of water rights were not at issue and, therefore, were not litigated in Woods Irrigation Company v. The Department of Employment (1958) 50 Cal.2d 174. Rather, the issue before the court was whether WIC's employees were agricultural laborers and, thus, whether WIC was exempt from having to make unemployment insurance contributions on their behalf. The existence of WIC's water rights or those of its shareholders, was not challenged or at risk. MID incorrectly asserts that, based on statements in the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, WIC's attorney, Gilbert Jones, stated that WID had no water rights. The actual testimony from The Reporter's Transcript On Appeal, page 140 lines 21-23 is:

Q: I see. And does it own any water rights?

A: No water rights whatever are transferred by the owners of this land to this company.

A true and correct copy of the above referenced portion of the testimony is attached hereto as **Exhibit** "A". Hence, a review of the testimony relied upon by MID reveals that WIC's attorney at the time did not answer a question directly. Instead of answering whether water rights were held or owned, Mr. Jones offered non-responsive testimony regarding the lack of any transfer of water rights. As will be touched on below, a reading of the complete documents indicates that at this part of the testimony, and at all other parts therein, the discussion and testimony pertained to riparian water rights with no discussion or position given on any pre-1914 rights.

An actual determination of whether WIC held its own water rights, independent of its

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shareholders, was not a part, nor was deciding it necessary for the court's ultimate determination that WIC employees were exempt agricultural laborers. Consequently, the issues litigated in WIC v. Dept. of Employment are very different than those at issue in the CDO proceeding. Based on the obvious differences between the two cases, it is clear that the first three elements necessary to support a finding of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion are not satisfied and that the doctrine does not apply in this instance. The issue of WIC's water rights was not decided in the former proceeding. And, it was not necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Furthermore the former proceeding was not a water right adjudication nor was it a quiet title action. The former 1957 proceeding clearly did not involve a legal action to determine any water rights held by WIC.

In addition to failing to satisfy the first three elements of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion, the issues in dispute in the WIC CDO proceedings are important from a statewide public policy perspective. This is another factor preventing the SWRCB from determining that WIC is estopped from asserting, and further establishing, its water rights in the CDO proceeding.

MID's baseless request that the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion apply to the CDO proceeding further highlights the serious due process issues associated with the fact that the SWRCB may make findings and rulings concerning the water rights of those served by WIC; none of whom have received notice of the proceeding. As referenced above, it is quite obvious that the testimony in the <u>WIC v. Dept. of Employment</u> was focused on the fact that WIC was delivering the riparian right water of those being served through common facilities. The fact that such delivery also establishes a pre-1914 right does not appear to have been at issue in the case.

B. Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion is Not Applicable.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of a claim previously tried and decided. Mycogen Corp. V. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896-897. The claim in WIC v. Department of Employment specifically addressed WIC's claim that its employees were agricultural laborers thereby exempting WIC from having to make unemployment insurance contributions on their behalf. Any discussion of WIC's water rights, or the status of same, was not related to the claims at issue. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable.

C. The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel Is Not Applicable.

MID's contention that WIC is judicially estopped from asserting pre-1914 and riparian water rights in the subject CDO proceedings is misplaced. In <u>WIC v. Department of Employment</u>, the issues before the court clearly did not pertain to WIC's water rights. The evidence in the matter included superfluous, limited testimony related to water rights which was unclear and non-responsive. Moreover, there is no indication whatsoever that even the limited and incomplete discussion pertaining to water, involved or contemplated pre-1914 appropriate rights.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to preclude a party from gaining a litigation advantage by espousing one position and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum, (2009) 176 Ca. App.4th, 740. The dual purpose of the doctrine are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and protect parties from unfair strategies of their opponents. Id. WIC's water rights were not at issue in WIC v. Department of Employment, and pre-1914 rights were not discussed. WIC has gains no unfair advantage against its opponents or unfairly surprises them in this matter by asserting its own pre-1914 rights and the riparian rights of its member shareholders. WIC did not initiate this proceeding other than to request a hearing to prevent the Draft CDO from being adopted without opposition.

WIC's opponents in this proceeding have always known WIC claims to have valid water rights both on its own accord and through its member shareholders. WIC has been in existence diverting water onto Roberts Island since 1911. MID, and WIC's other opponents in this proceeding cannot seriously claim they have been unfairly surprised or disadvantaged because WIC continues to assert its right to legally divert water from the Delta. MID's claim that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies in this context has no merit.

D. MID's Assertion That WIC Cannot Assert Its Water Rights Before the SWRCB Because the California Supreme Allegedly Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Is Incorrect.

MID's position regarding alleged exclusive jurisdiction defies logic. MID asks the SWRCB to find that it has no jurisdiction to determine WIC's water rights yet MID took an opposite position in opposing a recent writ of prohibition filed by the Mussi et., al petitioners challenging SWRCB's authority to conduct the subject CDO proceedings. Moreover, MID is

asking the SWRCB to find that WIC is forever barred from defending or proving its water rights because of a decision in an unemployment insurance case in which water rights were not at issue. Clearly, MID's assertions must be rejected. III. **CONCLUSION** For the reasons set forth above, and for those that may be submitted orally on the record, MID's motion in limine must be denied. Dated: June 29, 2010 Attorney for South Delta and Central Delta Water Agency

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT.

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WOODS IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation,

Respondent,

vs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (HARRY W. STEWART, Director of Employment),

Appellants.

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

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APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO.

HON. MALCOLM C. GLENN, JUDGE.

--c0o--COUNSEL:

For Appellants:

HON. EDMUND G. BROWN, Attorney General of the State of California, IRVING H. PERLUSS, Assistant Attorney General, WILLIAM L. SHAW, Deputy Attorney General, Library and Courts Building, Sacramento 14, California.

For Respondent:

JONES, LANE, WEAVER & DALEY, By RICHARD DALEY, Esq., 351 Wilhoit Building, Stockton, California.

> OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS 306 COUNTY COURTHOUSE SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

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THE COURT: That is right, that is where it is pumped from.

A That is right, that is where the water is coming into the area for irrigation.

THE COURT: What is the pipe I showed you?

A That pipe is this pipe here.

THE COURT: I see.

A Now, this "canal" there is no such thing. There is no canal there like that. I don't know where the engineer got it, but that just doesn't exist.

(Witness referring to diagram.)

MR. DALEY: Q Mr. Jones, is this concrete structure -was that built by the Woods Irrigation Company? A It was.
Q Is that located on land that is owned by the company?
A Well, the Woods Irrigation Company owns -- in that sense owns no land. All of its works ore all easements, they are on the lands of the people who are the stockholders in the corporation. They have easements and rights-of-way over all of these lands but the Woods Irrigation Company itself does not own the land.

Q I see. And does it own any water rights?

A No water rights whatever are transferred by the owners of this land to this company.

MR. DALEY: That is all, thank you.

MR. SHAW: That is all, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: All right.